

29 May 61

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

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		NAME	TITLE
		[Signature]	Deputy Chief, EE

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ENCLOSURE	ABSTRACT	FILE NUMBER	
	INDEX	74-124-29/3	
DATE MICROFILMED		DOCUMENT DATE	DOCUMENT NUMBER

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S-E-C-R-E-T

TO: Chief of Base, Frankfurt
INFO: Chief of Station, Germany
SUBJECT: REDWOOD AERODYNAMIC
AECASSOWARY/29 Utilization
REFERENCE: EGFA-34199, 11 May 1961

1. We cannot believe that the reference was intended to impugn the validity of the benefit-versus-risk test in evaluating this or any other operational activity. This test is so integral a part of basic operational policy that we are certain your complaint was aimed not at the policy but at the correctness of its application in the AECASSOWARY/43 case and in like cases.

2. EGOW-1653 dated 30 June 1960 set forth Headquarters' rationale and objectives in mounting the KUTUBE collection aspects of the AERODYNAMIC project. That dispatch and its attachment expressly envisage instances where KUBARK may prefer to take over an AERODYNAMIC lead for unilateral exploitation. It also, however, clearly anticipates the "considerable proliferation of our capability to run the short-term briefed traveler type of operation and at the same time perhaps liberate some case officer strength" for more challenging professional tasks. It further states the desirability of nonattributability to ODYOKE in short-term traveler cases. In EGFA-31881, 12 September 1960, FOB accepted AECASSOWARY/29's PCS assignment to FOB for a trial period of one year, setting two conditions not here pertinent which were granted. It is highly doubtful that the exchange of correspondence left either Headquarters or FOB in the dark as to any fact or consideration involved in the implementation of the AECASSOWARY/29 program. We are unclear, therefore, as to why Headquarters ruling in the AECASSOWARY/43 case should have come as a surprise or as to why FOB's difference of opinion should have been pursued with the dogmatism and vigor reference reflects.

3. It may be useful to present Headquarters views again on the specific points raised in reference. Paragraph 2 of reference is entirely irrelevant because it is predicated on a hypothesis contrary to fact, viz., that

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"revelation of ODYOKE IS relationship with AECASSOWARY/1 is what is feared."

We have abundant evidence that the RIS is well aware of ODYOKE sponsorship of emigres organizations. This is true irrespective of the requirements levied on any legal traveler in the name of AECASSOWARY/1. What we seek to avoid is the furnishing of the RIS with the capability of demonstrating, through the mouth of an apprehended agent, not only that their claims of ODYOKE IS - AECASSOWARY/1 relationship are true but also that ODYOKE IS is currently exploiting the emigre organization for espionage purposes. The difference in propaganda impact between accurate surmise and proof positive may be seen in the Soviet silent suffering through years of U-2 activity and the contrasting Soviet vociferousness after Powers fell into their hands.

4. Similarly, even if AECASSOWARY/43 might suspect that "elite" requirements stem from an intelligence service, he is in no position to furnish proof to or for the Soviets of the proposition of which they have no doubt. However, AECASSOWARY/2 has made it quite clear that he can justify his interest in such requirements on the grounds that the military power balance between FJSTEAL and ODYOKE is of critical importance to the political hopes of AECASSOWARY and that any Soviet action or measure harmful to the people of the Soviet Ukraine is of interest to his organization for propaganda reasons.

5. In paragraph 4 of reference you discuss the desirability of direct FOB participation in "most" of the REDSKIN operations developed and mounted by AECASSOWARY/29. Since, as stated above, Headquarters anticipates direct FOB participation in some such operations, any discussion of proper proportion would be pointless until the details of a number of such operations have been differentiated. It is Headquarters view that the common, garden-variety short-term traveler type of operation such as AECASSOWARY/43 is precisely the type that AECASSOWARY/29 was trained to run and should be made to run. Since [] repeatedly stated at Headquarters that there are more REDSKIN opportunities in Germany than his total strength can handle, it appears doubtful whether the intrusion of an FOB case officer on the AECASSOWARY/43 operation would have been economical. We naturally presuppose that AECASSOWARY/29, assisted by his case officer, FOB and Headquarters, will have the competence required for running such operations responsibly and well. We do not take

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his competence on faith. We have taken into account FOB's high praise of his performance in EGFA-33630, dated 24 March 1961, his comprehensive training at Headquarters, his good training record--particularly in photography (where his training evaluation states "If AECASSOWARY/29's newly acquired skill can be put to use within a reasonable length of time, he should have no difficulty in putting the training across")--and in Soviet Realities Orientation. We know of no reason to distrust AECASSOWARY/29's integrity with respect to the honesty of his reporting or his fidelity to the tasks assigned to him and it seems to Headquarters that his competence may be judged on the same bases as is judged the competence of any other contract agent or of a case officer who handles a case alone. Indeed in the matter of security briefing, AECASSOWARY/29 is probably as well qualified as any case officer in FOB if not better qualified than most.

6. In AERODYNAMIC cases where KUBARK would have a distinct interest in running an operation directly--such as one involving a Soviet Ukrainian agent or agent prospect or an emigre REDSKIN agent whose tasks bear relation to unilateral KUBARK assets--there is no question in AECASSOWARY/2's mind that we will take over and, if we see fit, cut the AECASSOWARIES off from information about the progress of the operation. Generally, in such cases, we should prefer that the case officer intruded be qualified to play the role of an AECASSOWARY member in order to preserve nonattributability and to avoid risk of the agent reneging on change of masters. Such case officers are, of course, few. Therefore, we are quite prepared, in a proper case, to accept attributability where the agent is willing to accept KUBARK recruitment.

7. It follows from the foregoing that the premise on which your request for reconsideration of "policy" is ^{based is} inaccurate; i.e., to use the language of your fifth paragraph, we are able to step in directly in those cases where KUBARK and AECASSOWARY/29 deem it feasible and desirable to do so, but it is important to remember that Headquarters is part of KUBARK and that KUBARK is in a much better position to judge desirability than is AECASSOWARY/29. We should like to see the results of a full and fair trial year of AECASSOWARY/29's activity under the direction of FOB as originally agreed and we have very much in mind that our hopeful expectations, like prejudgment of any kind, may prove wrong.